...Then there is Abyei, a contested area largely populated by the Ngok Dinka, a South Sudanese ethnic group, but used seasonally also by the north s Misseriya, a cattle-herding group that migrates south during dry periods. ...One small sign of compromise by the South Sudan s government has come in the shape of it refusing to recognise an October ---- referendum in Abyei, which saw --.- of registered voters opt in favor of becoming part of the south. Whilst the south s central government, in the capital, Juba, has long argued that an Abyei plebiscite should take place, with only permanent residents (ie Ngok Dinka, rather than Misseriya) eligible to vote, it took the same position as the African Union and Sudan s government on the October exercise, saying that it had been hastily convened by the local dispensation without the consent of all parties and in the absence of key political prerequisites. Yet, to keep Sudan s central government on-side, President Kiir s government will surely need to make additional conces- sions on Abyei, including withdrawing SPLA forces from the area, even accounting for the fact that Sudan has maintained a police presence in the area, similarly contravening the June ---- agreement. A failure to withdraw SPLA elements will likely escalate bilateral tensions, such that conflict takes place not only between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya, but also directly between the security forces of the two countries. However, at the same time, there is significant cross-over between Ngok Dinka militia and SPLA contingents in and around Abyei, so the SPLA s high command may not be respected on the ground, in the event of an order being issued from Juba to withdraw from Abyei.
...SPLA over the last few months against the southern rebels. A regional bloc, the Inter-governmental Authority on Develop- ment (IGAD), has pressed strongly for the UPDF presence to be replaced by a regional force, comprised of troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda, which will be tasked with protecting key installations, including oil facilities. ...These include additional geographical concessions, in the event that the border demarcation process finally gets under way, and potentially also paying higher pipeline fees, in the event of a further fall in oil output. Obviously, concessions of such magnitude will be difficult for Kiir to justify domestically, and he may already be calculating on the basis of losing the support of Sudan, especially given his strong military dependence on Uganda � a relationship which he will surely remain ultra keen to maintain, even at the expense of the rapprochement with Sudan. In closing, the deepening of the south-south conflict, Kiir s strong military reliance on Uganda, together with ongoing post-secession wrangles and the historical strains between Juba and Khartoum, indicate that Sudan s allegiance is increasingly likely to switch to the rebel side, if the latter make further gains. ...Following the conclusion of the civil war, elevated oil prices and growing demand (barring the global economic downturn) have both helped the industry to develop. Significant foreign direct investment has flooded into Sudan and South Sudan in recent years, predominantly from the Middle East and China, to finance the development of the oil industry.
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